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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the role of cities in fostering metropolitan-wide financial cooperation. I
suggest that cities face a relative gains problem when considering cooperating with each other.
Cities with comparable characteristics and in close proximity compete with each other, and
because they do, relative gains matter. In such circumstances, cooperation is difficult between
cities. And without city participation, overall metropolitan cooperation is reduced. A model of
regional cooperation based on this coordination problem is proposed. Differing concepts and
measures of municipal homogeneity within a metropolitan region are explored. Unlike a
previous study at the municipal level (Krueger and McGuire 2005), the findings at the
metropolitan level are inconsistent with this theory.

INTRODUCTION
A central tenant of the burgeoning literature on regional cooperation and governance
structures is the idea that cooperation is necessarily difficult because local governments compete
with one another. In a host of arenas from tax rates to quality-of-life services to development
incentive packages, local governments compete for residents, employers and tax bases.
When competition is measured explicitly, it is typically measured as the total number of
governments in a geographically bound area. Yet recent work on regional governance structures
has identified such a measure as conforming more closely to fragmentation, a measure that is
conceptually distinct from competition.
This is not to say that fragmentation does not lead to competition, but rather that
fragmentation is a double-edged sword. Fragmentation can generate Tiebout-type competition
under some conditions but it also leads to greater opportunities for cooperation due to the greater
number of potential partners.
This study attempts to identify a theoretical distinction between fragmentation and
cooperation, and suggests an alternative mechanism for the measurement of competition between
local governments. Building on a previous study of municipalities (Krueger and McGuire 2005),
this study develops a measure of competition based on the Tiebout Hypothesis and tests its
ability to explain interlocal financial cooperation in metropolitan areas. The findings are
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inconsistent with our previous findings. The anomalous findings and future research directions
are discussed.

PROXIMITY: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?
Much of the economic literature based on Tiebout’s idea, evolving from the work of
Oates 1972) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980), has been interested in the study of how
competition in the public institutions market can generate production efficiency. The work,
primary by economists (but see Schneider 1986), has utilized competition as an independent
variable to explain variances in either expenditures or own-source revenues. Early empirical
analyses by Oates (1985) and Nelson (1987) found mixed support for the idea that competition
reduces expenditures, but more recent work at the local level – including studies by Zax (1989)
on all governments aggregated to the county level, Forbest and Zampelli (1989) on county
revenues, Sjoquist (1982) on central city expenditures, and Eberts and Gronbert (1990) on
spending in metropolitan areas – find stronger support for the idea.
But the leviathan studies misrepresent the original intent of Tiebout’s work. The Tiebout
Hypothesis does not treat local governments as automatons that are ready and easy substitutes. It
suggests, rather, a sorting process in which residents and business are attracted to communities
that have a mix of programs, spending, and taxation that conform to their preferences. This does
not imply a “drive to the bottom” in which all cities become the same. To the extent that
residents have heterogeneous preferences for policy outputs, local governments should be
equally heterogeneous. Thus, using a simple count of the number of local governments cannot
capture the variety of types of competition and opportunities for cooperation that occur when
many local governments are in close proximity.
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Studies in the urban politics and economic development fields have been equally
equivocal. Some find that fragmentation leads to greater cooperation, others find that it inhibits
cooperation. Post (2002), for example, develops a model of the total number of local
governments in a metropolitan area that cooperate financially and finds that the density of local
governments is a better measure of fragmentation than a simple count of the number of
jurisdictions per capita, and that metro areas with greater density of governments cooperate more
than areas with lower densities. Johnson and Neiman (2004) study city economic development
policies and measure fragmentation as the number of other cities within a five-mile radius.
Utilizing a survey, they then create an additional measure of competition by asking cities to
identify other competitive cities. While this approach avoids the problem of a simple count of
jurisdictions, it leaves open the question of why some cities perceive others as particularly
competitive. They find that both measures of competition lead to greater cooperation in
economic development.
Olberding (2002) suggests that fragmentation creates problems for cooperation because it
reduces the ability of ability of local governments to regularly interact and create norms of
cooperative behavior. She finds that fragmentation leads fewer interlocal cooperative
agreements in economic development. Feiock, Tao and Johnson (2004), however, question this
and suggest that overall metropolitan cooperation can foster the sorts of norms of cooperation
that will increase the probability of reaching interlocal deals on economic development. When
they include a measure of total cooperation in a model of regional economic development
partnerships, they find that the number of cities in the metro area is irrelevant, the number of
counties positively associated with cooperation, but that the number of special districts is
negatively associated with cooperation.
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In a recent study, Krueger and McGuire (2005) suggest that competition is best measured
between cities that are most alike. That study suggests that interlocal cooperation is fostered
when cities are dissimilar in characteristics. This approach separates fragmetation – which can
both necessitates cooperation and makes it challenging – from competition. They find that
competition impedes financial cooperation in a large sample of cities across the county.

RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE GAINS FROM COOPERATION
The work of Tiebout and colleagues (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Tiebout 1956)
suggests that cities compete in a market-like way to provide an optimal mix of goods and
services at the lowest overall tax rate. They do this because they are in competition for residents
and employers who are – at least at the margins – discriminating consumers of government
service packages.
This competition creates countervailing motivations for local governments. On the one
hand, they want to reduce production costs as a means to enhance existing programs, provide
new services, or reduce tax rates. One of the ways cities can attempt to accomplish this goal is
through the generation of slack resources made available by jointly implementing a service. On
the other hand, governments generally avoid agreements that disproportionately favor a partner
because any relative gain to the partner could be used to generate slack resources that can be
utilized to attract residents and businesses from one jurisdiction to another.
Local governments that provide a similar basket of goods at similar tax rates and are in
close proximity will be the most competitive. In such cases, the total gains that each might
receive through cooperation is less important than the relative gains one achieves more or less
than the partner. If one city can achieve more slack resources, it can use those resources to gain
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a comparative advantage against its partner in their competition for residents and employers.
Competition, then, creates a zero-sum game for cooperators.
On the other hand, when local governments provide a different basket of goods and
services and consequently serve different publics, the degree of competition is lower. Lower
competition for proximate cities creates incentives to focus on absolute gains. Both cities gain
from cooperation, and unequal gains are tolerated because they do not mean a potential loss of
residents and employers to their partner. In these situations, the game is transformed from a
zero-sum game to a positive-sum game.
Competition, then, is a function of the market of local governments and can be measured
by the degree to which market participants (local governments) are homogeneous. The total
number of local governments in this framework is less relevant than the degree to which local
governments are similar. Under this conceptual approach to competition, heterogeneous markets
allow governments to focus on absolute gains and consequently foster cooperation; more
homogeneous markets conversely create an interest in relative gains and reduce cooperation.
The idea that homogeneity of actors reduces interest in cooperation contrasts sharply with
much of the work on local cooperation, especially with respect to common pool resources. But
work at the nation-state level suggests otherwise. At the international level, cooperation is often
best achieved among actors who are dissimilar (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, Feiock 2005).
Efforts to fully understand the differences in observed outcomes remain incomplete.
This study utilizes a measure of competition suggested by Krueger and McGuire (2005)
to evaluate the impact of homogeneity, conceptually linked to competition, on cooperation. A
fully specified model of cooperation at the metropolitan level of analysis, including control
variables, is described below.
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MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Dependent Variable. Cooperation is measured as the total amount of interlocal revenue
received by all governments (cities, counties and special districts, but not including school
districts) in each MSA for the fiscal year that ended in 2002, as collected by the 2002 Census of
Governments. It is divided by the population of the MSA, which is aggregated from all the
counties comprising that MSA based on the 2002 Census of the Population. Financial
cooperation is one of many forms of cooperation, and a narrow one. It is assumed that the
exchange of limited resources represents a form of cooperation that is particularly difficult to
achieve. Nevertheless, the average amount of interlocal transfers1 for a metro area in 2002 was
$47,954,000. For cities, the average was $17.6 million, for counties the average was $14.5
million and for special districts the average was $11.7 million.
Metropolitan areas were chosen as the unit of analysis for this project to evaluate the total
amount of cooperation that occurs in a geographically defined area. Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) are defined by the federal Office of Management and Budget as a large regional
center of economic activity. The OMB identifies each of the counties, and by extension the
cities and special districts, that are included in each MSA. Each MSA, then, is a small laboratory
in which to test theories of cooperation and competition on governments that operate in close
proximity to one another.

Homogeneity and Competition. While a number of mechanisms can be explored to measure
the concept of market homogeneity, this study follows Krueger and McGuire (2005) and
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measures homogeneity as the degree of variance in the market, controlling for the size of the
market. For any given metropolitan market X, homogeneity is:
Homogeneity x =

SDx
∑X

where SD is the standard deviation of a government characteristic. Calculating it this way, large
numbers represent higher levels of heterogeneity, and consequently lower levels of competition,
while lower levels represent homogeneity and higher levels of competition. Thus, I expect that a
positive relationship between this measure and cooperation.
At least three other measures of heterogeneity are potentially available. The coefficient
of variation is commonly used and is simply the standard deviation divided by the mean, but is
only appropriate in cases where the standard deviation is less than the mean. Such is not the case
for any of the data utilized in this study – city characteristics appear to vary substantially. The
Herfindahl index is another common measure, but is focused on measuring the degree of market
concentration, rather than measuring the average degree of difference between market
participants. Finally, the Gini coefficient is another option since it is designed to measure the
differences between market participants. But no practical way of measuring the Gini across
more than 300 markets is readily available (that this author knows of).
In addition to the choice of calculation methodology, a choice must be made on which of
the many characteristics of local government best represents the differences between local
governments in a way that captures their competitive nature. The choice is not purely
methodological – different measures capture different aspects of the nature of local government,
and thus have theoretical implications for understanding the nature of interlocal competition.
The literature growing out of the Tiebout tradition is silent on this issue, but Krueger and
1

The Census of Governments reports interlocal transfers on an expenditure and revenue basis. Revenue data are
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McGuire apply the above formula to the

Table 1. Heterogeneity Correlation Matrix
Population Expenditures
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity

population of cities in metro areas
because size has long been a central
concern of the traditional literature on

Population Heterogeneity
Expenditure Heterogeneity
Med. Home Value Hetergeneity

.7403*
.7321*

.6839*

group cooperation (Olson 1965). However, this is certainly not the only way that cities can be
differentiated. Another option is to measure the homogeneity of government expenditures from
the 2002 Census of Governments. To the extent that community preferences are manifest in
different levels of total spending, differences is spending levels can be an indicator of
competition. MSAs with many cities with similar spending levels will suffer from higher levels
of competition and consequently have lower levels of cooperation. A third option is to choose
among any number of measures of the socio-economic status of cities. For this study, I opted to
utilize the median home value from the 2000 Population Census in each city in an effort to
capture the impact that differences in the tax base have on cooperation.
In each case, the measure was calculated only for cities to evaluate the impact that
competition between cities has on overall cooperation. Cities and special districts are the most
critical measures of fragmentation in a metropolitan area (Foster 1997), but unlike special
districts, cities have non-overlapping geographic boundaries and identifiable population
characteristics.
Each of the measures is strongly correlated with the other (see Table 1). Simple crosscorrelations of the three show that all are statistically significant at the .05 level of significance
and the lowest correlation is .6839 between median home value heterogeneity and expenditure
heterogeneity.

utilized for this study due to reporting reliability issues.
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To control for the potential effect of fragmentation and its impact on competition, the
model includes measures of the count of the number of cities in the MSA and the number of
special districts in the MSA (Foster 1997). Both are divided by the MSA population to control
for the overall size of the MSA. The number of cities and special districts comes from the 2002
Census of Governments. It is anticipated that cooperation is fostered by the number of available
cooperation partners. Thus, increases in the per capita number of cities and special districts
should be associated with higher levels of per capita interlocal financial cooperation.

Control Variables. Four control variables are included in this analysis. Based on previous
analysis (Krueger and McGuire 2005), the structural attributes of cities plays an important role in
the degree of cooperation in an MSA. Thus, three measures of city structure are included. They
are the proportion of cities with a city manager form of government, the proportion of cities with
in which the candidate’s party affiliation is identified on the election ballot and the average
proportion of council seats that are elected at-large versus elected by district or ward. All three
variables are codes from data available in the 1997 International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) survey of its members.
First, much of the literature on local cooperation demonstrates the importance of a
professional city manager. City managers have norms of professional conduct and careers less
tied to the outcomes of an election. They can thus make commitments to block rent-seeking
behavior in such a pluralistic settings as networks of cooperating governments (Feiock, Jeong,
and Kim 2003; Feiock and Kim 2000). Mayors acting as chief executives and city council
members, who rely on the financial and electoral support of various interests, may be less
successful in resisting such rent-seeking behavior. Cities with the city manager form of
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government, then, are expected to foster cooperation. As the proportion of city manager-run
cities in an MSA increases, the amount of financial cooperation in the MSA is expected to
increase. Cities with the city-manager form were coded as a dummy variable and then
aggregated as a proportion of all cities for which the form of government is known in the MSA.
Second, single-member districts motivate politicians to focus on narrow interests (Kettle
2002). At-large districts, alternatively, curb this tendency by motivating politicians to focus on
majoritarian issues. Cities organized to support the pluralistic policymaking of single-member
districts institutionalize mechanisms for negotiation and deal-making. Such institutionalized
learning can be applied to cooperative ventures externally as well. Cities that learn to foster
cooperation on their councils are expected to improve cooperation in the MSA. This variable is
measured as the average proportion of seats that are at large for all cities in an MSA for which
this data is available.
Third, although non-partisan elections play a critical role in the institutional structure of
city governments, it is anticipated that they do little to motivate cities to foster MSA cooperation.
This variable is measured as the proportion of cities with partisan elections as a percent of all
cities in the MSA for which this data is available.
Finally, expenditures per capita are included in the model to capture the underlying
motivation of political leaders in the MSA to cooperate to reduce costs. Cooperation is often
viewed in the regionalism literature as a mechanism for solving economies of scale problems in
highly fragmented systems. Larger, consolidated governments can take advantage of the cost
savings associated with the increasing returns to scale associated with the production of many
government goods and services, while fragmented governments cannot. Short of consolidation,
fragmented governments can utilize cooperative forms of production to achieve similar ends.
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Thus, it is anticipated that high expenditures per capita will be associated with higher levels of
cooperation. The expenditure data is available in the 2002 Census of Governments and
represents the total expenditures of all governments in each MSA.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Three ordinary least squares regressions were run for each of the three heterogeneity
variables of interest, plus one excluding the three to test the impact of fragmentation measures
independent of the heterogeneity measures (see Table 2). The three heterogeneity measures
could not be included in a single model because of the collinearity between the measures. The
dependent variable, expenditures per capita, and each of the three heterogeneity variables was
logged to reduce the impact of skewness in the measures. A total of 301 MSAs were included in
the analysis after exclusions due to unavailable data. Diagnostic tests did not reveal any residual
heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity.

Control Variables. Unlike previous studies, including the Krueger and McGuire work on which
this model was based, the city manager variable was statistically insignificant in all four models.
It was anticipated that professional city manager would foster cooperation at the local level and
that this impact would be felt across the entire MSA as cities work with each other, counties, and
special districts to foster cooperation. While a strong finding in support of this notion was found
at the city level of analysis by Krueger and McGuire, this appears to not be the case for MSAs
overall.
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Table 2. Per Capita Value of All Financial Cooperation in an MSA (logged)
Proportion of City's with City Manager
form of government

1
0.001917
(.0016303)

2
0.0016251
(.0015935)

3
0.0017615
(.001639)

4
0.0015376
(.0016438)

Proportion of cities in which the party
of the candidate is identified in elections

-0.0049262 **
(.0017178)

-0.0047972 **
(.0016822)

-0.004627 **
(.0017622)

-0.0053948 **
(.0017298)

Average city council seats elected
at large

0.002089
(.0019631)

0.0017533
(.0019239)

0.0024702
(.0019662)

0.002789
(.0019702)

Expenditures per capita (logged)

0.8500132 **
(.1122326)

0.8527443 **
(.1100618)

0.8498385 **
(.1129702)

0.854447 **
(.1135392)

Heterogeneity of Population (logged)

-0.2294049 **
(.0813905)
-0.2961771 **
(.0664347)

Heterogeneity of Expenditures (logged)

-0.1461999 **
(.0722925)

Heterogeneity of Home Value (logged)

Number of cities in MSA per capita

-1885.355
(1478.177)

-3038.117 **
(1488.333)

-2125.516
(1538.843)

-1181.665
(1474.047)

Number of special districts in MSA
per capita

140.3926
(823.5802)

163.2437
(805.5088)

88.82267
(829.7573)

-102.029
(828.6938)

Intercept

-1.935271 **
(.8677304)

-1.970451 **
(.8327317)

-2.445001 **
(.8456112)

Cases
Adj. R2

301
.2119

301
.2420

301
.2017

-2.571155 **
(.847727)
301
.1933

Similarly, the average proportion of at-large city council districts had no statistical impact
on MSA total cooperation. It was anticipated that single-member districts fostered cooperative
organizations that translated those internal bargaining skills to external relations. While this
hypothesis was supported in the analysis of cities by Krueger and McGuire, it is not supported in
this analysis at the MSA level.
Interestingly, the proportion of cities with partisan elections is statistically significant and
in the negative direction. As the proportion of cities in the MSA with partisan elections
increases, cooperation decreases. Although this has long been an important measure of reform
for cities, it was anticipated that partisanship in the electoral cycle would have little impact on
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levels of cooperation. Indeed, Krueger and McGuire found in their study of cities that it had no
statistically significant impact. This study demonstrates, however, that as the proportion of cities
with partisan elections rises, the degree of overall MSA cooperation declines. This anomalous
finding is curious and there is no ready explanation.
The impact of expenditures per capita was statistically significant and in the anticipated
positive direction. MSAs with higher levels of spending cooperate more, presumably under the
rationale that cooperation can achieve economies of scale and ultimately limit those higher
spending levels. This finding was consistent across all four models.

Homogeneity and Competition. It was anticipated that heterogeneity of the population,
expenditures, and median home value of cities in an MSA would lead to greater cooperation,
whereas homogeneity in these measures for cities would lead to less cooperation. This is the
essence of the relative gains argument in Krueger and McGuire and presented in the theoretical
discussion above. However, the impact of heterogeneity in fostering competition at the city level
of analysis is not supported by this study at the MSA level of analysis. In fact, just the opposite.
At the MSA level, city homogeneity rather than heterogeneity fosters cooperation. In each of the
three models for the different operationalizations of homogeneity, cooperation is facilitated by
homogeneity of the cities in the MSA, rather than by heterogeneity.
Interestingly, in only of the models – with heterogeneity of expenditures included – is the
variable for city fragmentation statistically significant. Interestingly, municipal fragmentation
appears to reduce the level of total MSA cooperation. In no model is the measure of special
district fragmentation statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Post’s (2002)
finding that fragmentation is rarely significant (although the coefficients were in the negative
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direction). Her research suggests that a better measure of fragmentation is the density of local
governments in an MSA, measured as the number of cities divided by the total square miles in an
MSA.

CONCLUSIONS
This study attempts to measure the influence that city structures and behaviors have on
overall MSA cooperation patterns. What I find is a mixed story. The proportion of city
managers and the average of at-large districts have no effect, despite being strongly correlated
with cooperation measures at the city level (based on a previous study by Krueger and McGuire
2005). Interestingly, the proportion of cities with partisan ballots has a statistically significant
negative effect on the degree of MSA cooperation. MSA expenditures per capita has a
significant positive effect on cooperation, consistent with the notion that metro areas facing high
expenditures cooperate in an effort to reduce costs through economies of scale.
The primary focus of this study is to evaluate different measures of competition between
cities and their impact on overall MSA cooperation. Krueger and McGuire (2005) find that
relative gains considerations – operationalized as municipal market homogeneity – reduce city
cooperation, while heterogeneous municipal markets increase cooperation. This study utilized a
similar measure – but extended to measure the homogeneity of three characteristics – and found
the opposite effect: City homogeneity fosters total MSA cooperation.
This study hypothesized that city heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity, would foster
MSA cooperation. Part of the reason this was anticipated is that cities have long been noted to
be a central player in metropolitan cooperation (see, for example, Thurmayer and Wood 2002).
But in interlocal financial cooperation, cities do not dominate strongly. As Table 3
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demonstrates, city financial

Table 3. Average Cooperation in an MSA

cooperate in an MSA has a mean
value of $17.7 million, only
slightly higher than the county rate
of $14.5 million and only 40

Cities
Special Districts
Counties

Total Dollar Value of
financial cooperation
(mean across all MSAs)

Percentage of
Total Dollar
Value by Type

$17,681,990
$14,453,310
$11,734,480

40%
33%
27%

percent of the total. Cities are key players, but they do not predominate interlocal cooperation.
Fragmentation and the proximity associated with it has long been understood to be a twoedged sword. On the one hand, fragmentation leads to a greater number of opportunities for
cooperation. But it also creates competition that sometimes leads to less cooperation than we
might suspect. The inconsistent findings in the literature on this subject in recent years suggests
that we do not yet fully appreciate the causal mechanisms that create incentives and disincentives
to cooperate for proximate local governments.
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